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REPUBLICS OF ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE
a paper for the
April,1986
SOCIALIST SCHOLA~S CONFERENCE
New York, N.Y.

by
Prexy Nesbitt
April 19,1986

April 1986
Prexy Nesbitt

Sometimes you have to do it to the children to
make the adults talk. There ·was a 12-year-old
boy. We wanted to know what was going on.. We
wanted his mother to talk, so we tied him up like
a chicken with his wrists behind his back,
strapped to his ankles. Then we played water
polo with him, put him in this kind of d~m and
pushed him about, let him sink. Every so often
we took him out. H~ wouldn't cry. He just wet
himself. The mother didn't tell us anything.
In the end w_e just left him in the water and he
drowned.
--Trevor Edwards, a British mercenary
on operations for the South African
Army in Angola (Guardian, 29.1, 1981)
That South Africa is one of the world's most violent societies
is now indisputable.

One facet of its violence is. derived from the

deep structural inequities and repression of the system.

It is the

violence t~ people's lives that emanates from situations like those
I

identified in a recent Carnegie Corporation-financed study entitled,
"The Second Carnegie Inquiry f nto Poverty in Southern Africa."

Among

the study's findings were the following:
a) the number )of people made destitute by landlessness and
unemployment had increased between 1960 and 1980 from · ·
4.9 million to 8.9 million;
b) that the migratory labor system destroys family life.
One-third of the migrant male workers of several villages
interviewed spent only one month per year with their
families;
c) on the white-owned farms, black laborers earned as Little
as $10 a month and 63% of the men were underweight; and
d) some black rural areas had one doctor for every 174,999
people.
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Nineteen eighty-five has made it patently cl~ar that t~e major
trademark of the Pretoria government is violence.

In the last nine-

teen months, a minimum of 1,400 people have ~een killed in South Africa,
an average of five/day, is what the Institute of Race Relations called it,
t~e majority as a result of police bullets. As many as 23 major

leaders of. the country's largest legal opposition, the United Democratic Front (with over 1.5 million members), have been killed or are
missing under suspicious circumstances.
Additionally, there is a clear pattern of vigilante and death
squad violence in South Africa.

The methods used by the groups vary

from harassment to acid in the eyes of activists' children to murder
and mutilation.

Some acts are directed at little-known activists,

others, like the 1980 slaying of black attorney Griffiths Mxenge and
the 1985 slaying of his wife, lawyer Victoria Mxenge, are directed at
prominent leadership.

According to Africa News, some 800 incident~

are known to have ocurred since 1965.
Another aspect of the violence in South Africa is the violence
of a totaliy militarized soci~ty.

It is rooted in the two to three

million dollars per day which the South African Defence Force (SADF)
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expends today in Namibia and in South Africa .itself.

It is in the

"total strategy" all-out-war mentality manifesting itself widely in

''
South Africa and, as well, in Namibia.

The "total strategy" was

articulated first in a 1977 Defence Department White . Paper on National
Security.

Today, it is the South African polity 1 s new and revised
I

bible.

Drafted shortly after the 1976 Soweto uprising, the total

strategy argues that South Africa is engaged in a war against a
multi-dimensional

campaign which Russia (and its allies like the

World Council Qf Churches, the U.S. Conference of ,Mayors, the Congressional Black Caucus, TransAfrica and the American Committee on Africa)
.

'

.

is waging against the West.

It is a _c ampaign with a goal, according

to a 1982 government commission on the media, "of nothing les.s than
the political and moral subversion of the white man and his replacement by a black majority government . . • .. . It is therefore essential,"
argues the 1977 White Paper, "that a Total National Strategy be
formulated at the highest level.

The defence of the Republic of

-South Africa is not soley the responsibility of the Department of
Defence.

On the contrary • • • (it) is the combined responsibility of
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a .1 1 government de-p artments.

'.J

This can be taken further--i t is the

responsibility of the entire population, the nation and every popu-

"

·

lation group."
Thus, it is that South Africa today is really run by the semisecret State Security Council (SSC), chaired and dominated by President
Botha, former Minister of Defence, and staffed by military officers.
As the Washington Post noted as early as 1980,

"in many ways the

I
State Security Council is already an alternative cabinet by virtue of

the decisions it makes."
But there is another aspect to the violence of apartheid, one
which receives scant attention in the U.S. press.

It is the violence '

which manifests itself in the brutal, nearly bi-monthly destabili'

'

zation raids and actions which South Africa and its surrogate forces
(UNITA in Angola, the MNR in Mozambique, and similar , formations in
Zimbabwe and Lesotho, e.g., the Lesotho Liberation Army) conduct$
upon the neigh~oring countries of Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho,

~S,/~~;,_
';Pl=l6HilQ~aids include. the May 4, 19 78 Kassinga,

Botswana and Zambia./

...

Angola invasion ( 800 WOll!i'n and children killed) ; the January 12, 1981
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Matola Mozambique raid on an ANC home (13 killed); the May 23, 1982
attack on Matola and bombing of Maputo factories (19 Mozambican
; '

citizens killed); the December 9, 1982 invasion of Maseru, Lesotho
(42 South refugees and Lesotho citizens killed); the June 14, 1985
invasion of Gabrone, Botswana (16 killed, one of them a six-year-old
girl); the January 1, 1986 South African economic blockade of Lesotho,
:)

~ t h e January 20, 1986 South African-sponsored coup d'etat of the
Mi
'J-

Jonathan Leabua government in Lesoth'J/\

Ma-a 1qa ~ \f\ \/G\',l~ ~ ~o.. I ~~~
l
In Angola alone the damage
-J

c~
fkb"'1,....

done by South African invasions and sabotage of Angolan industrial
installations (e.g., the June 1985 attempted sabotage of Gulf Oil's
facilities in Cabinda, Angola) since 1975 is conservatively estimated
at ten to twelve billion dollars.

In the four-year period between

1981 antl 1985 South Africa carried out 4,000 invasions of Angolan
airspace, 168 bombing raids, . 234 'airborne troop landings, 90 strafing
I

incidents, 74 ground attacks and four naval landings.

Since 1975

I

South African army forces and the So~th African-backed UNITA force
~ave killed and wounded thousands of Angolan civilians and Namibian
refugees.

The.lives of hundreds of thousands more have been disrupted
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by the constant state of war r hich the Angolan people have experienced, starting with the struggle against
Portugese colonialism in
,,
1961.
Mozambique has suffered in the same way as Angola from the brutal
)-.

policies of ?lg~ressia>n and destabilization which Pretoria pursues
throughout the region . . Samora Machel, President of Mozambique, noted
in a 1984 .speech that:
Our people had their property looted, their houses
destroyed, their granaries looted, their crops pillaged
and flattened, their tools burnt and destroyed. The
~~~ ~ommunal villages and cooperatives, the schools and
A.:\t\~
clinics ·, the wells and dams built by the people with
(!,. ,to\,Q..,jl,,.
so much effort and sacrifice became targets for the
\~
enemies' criminal f ,ury. The systematic destruction
. 1
l
of economic infrastructure, bridges and roads, shop~
and warehouses, sawmills, plantations, agricultural
and industrial machinery, electricity supply lines,
fuel tanks, lorries and buses, locomotives and
carriages has prevented the implementation of economic
development projects of the utmost importance for the
well-being of the Mozambican people.
840 school.shave been destroyed or closed, affecting
more than 150,000 schoolchildren. Twelve health
centres, 24 maternity clinics, 174 health posts and
two centres for the physically handicapped have been
sacked and destroyed. Nine hundred shops have been
destroyed, hampering marketing and supplies for about
~our and a half million citizens.
·
It is the final point in the Machel selection above which illustrates
the most basic trait of the South African government raids (or those

of its surrogates, UNITA and MNR) which should bee highlighted.
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As is the case with U.S. aggression against Nicaragua, the
primary objective of South African/MNR/UNITA attacks is the popu-

''
lation itself of the countries involved.

True, often it is the

infrastructure targets--bridges, highways, water stations, power
installations--in Angola and Mozambique which are attacked.

But

increasingly it is schools, hospitals; marketplaces, churches

.I
supportive · of government policies, e.g., the M~thodist Church in
Angola and its.outspoken bishop, which are the ta~gets.

The goal

of the attacks is beyond the mere physical destruction of a facility
or institution.

Rather, it is to make the general population lose

its faith and belief in the ability of the government to govern; it
is to undercut the legitimacy of an Angola, Mozambique or Nicaragua
by destroying the people's will to believe in the dream and participate in the building of the new society .

.President Jose Eduardo dos

Santos described the South African/UNITA attacks as aiming at "weakening the (Angolan) economy and wiping out the social achievements won
by the workers."

World-renown scholar John Saul, in his brilliant

November 1985 paper on Soubh African aggression, prepared for the

Insert

But let us place

~
.1. f
•
,..--.-o
Q.,.,,...~
'"'• s~

11-Mc.. - ,. f-..\ .,...,..._...,... ,
~this11 on a broader plane.
Samor"a

t-:.,..,_.,_
....

,.,. • ~ -

Machel captured the essence of ;•what is fearful about
the angolas,cubas,nicaraguas and mozambiques of the world
when he said:

Because we follow aoclaliam aa a path to development, we
are the targets of criminal actlona unleashed by Imperiallam. Thoae acUona are manipulated directly by the Pretoria regime which finances and arms bandits •..• Economic, political and social destabilization la the central
and fundamental objecUve of racist South Africa when It
sends Into our country gangs of loyal servants to carry out
Ila ordera, 102
Aa Prutdent Machel put It, South Africa "ls attacking our decision
to defeat underdevelopment":

The Pretoria minority regime le afraid of our victory over
underdevelopment. They are afraid that succeaa In this
decade wlll demonstrate the superiority of the socialist
ayatem. The South African regime Is afraid that the conaolldatlon of our development will accelerate the dynamic
of the economic llberaUon !of Southern Africa, that It will
be a stimulus for the total liberation of the peoples of the

_ _ ---,----~-~,

~

regton.103

The South African regime, a few days ago, alleged that Mozambique threatened
it by concentrating sophisticated arms on its frontiers. What are the arms to
which they refer? Neither economically nor militarily do we represent a threat
to anyone. No reasonable person can think that an underdeveloped country as
poor as we, still bloodied from the wounds of war, can pose a threat to the sover- .
eignty, and territorial ~tegrity, the stability of another state, particularly one as/
powerful as South Africa. In fact, the only thing that the regime can fear is our
example of creating a non-racial society. (President Samora Machel quoted in
Noticias, August 24, 1982)
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It 's th'is that s ca res th e s__ o u t o f the
., . .. .. $outh .. ~frican
.
an o government
its allies and leads them to take the ~ath which
Basil Davidson has described in the following way:
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J

African Studies Association, called the types of attacks currently
being ·conducted by South African-backed MNR
I ,

efforts to e,c lipse the

popular enthusiasm of the Mozambican people for their FRELIMO govern-

~nt.~

In some respects, South African aggression against Mozambique and
Angola, against the frontline states generally and especially against

the effort for ·regional unity, S.A.D.C.C', is not new.

The verses may

~~

be different but the refrain is the same.

7
Throu~hout the 1960s South Africa and the U.S. were the iron

fist and velvet glove duo in terms of political, economic and military
support to Portugal as it desperately sought to maintain its overseas
colonies in Africa.

'
South
African troops fought side py side with

the Portugese in both Angola and in Mozambique.

At various points

during the war, · South Africa n helicopters flew supply and reconnais1

sance Llissions.

In Bie Province, South African soldiers guarded

the Kassinga iron mines.

I

In 1969 South Africa joined Portugal in

the Cunene River development scheme not only to g,e t a cheap source
of electricity for South Africa but also to bolster the already-

✓
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flagging Portugese resolve to remain in Angola.

In December 1971,

President Richard Nixon followed up his 19 70 U. N. sanctions-violating -·

,·

contribution of 22 Cessna duo-purpose light planes to the South
African military wiht what he called a Christmas gift of $436 million
in economic assistance to Portugal--all part of the Azores Pact
between Portugal and the U.S.A.

(The Azores Pact was , incidentally

a supplement to the over $320 million in direct military a ·s sistance
given to Portugal during 1950-1970, the military training programs,

the Boeing 707s and the regular shipments of napalm and herbicides.)

Rambo Rides Silver Towards the Benguela:
the 1985-86 U.S. intervention into Angola
What is new in the current situation of the South African/U.S.
offensives against the frontline states, especially Angola, is the
intensity and scope of the Reagan Administration's intervention to
destroy the People's Republic of Angola.
some of the more recent developments:

Let us review briefly

Nesbitt. page lO
*.From the inception of the Reagan Administration in 19 80,
conservative forces mobilize against both Angola and

',

Mozambique, e.g., Senator Richar Lugar opines in the
December 15,, 1980 Washington Star that it is urgent to
1

help UNITA stem the tide of l980s-style Soviet "white
I

European imperial ~sm in a Black African nation";

*In July 1985, the Clark Amendment, originally passed in
1976 prohibiting covert or overt U.S. assistance to
rebels fighting in Angola; is repealed by the Congress;

'

~

.

•:.

Nesbitt

page 11
/

Throughout 1985 the conservative lobby led by organizations

like the Conservative Caucus, the Heritage Foundation and

the American Security Council and by . individuals like Senators

Jesse Helms, and Representat ives ·Jack Kemp and Claude Pepper
mobilizes to: 1) attack Gulf/Chevron for continuin~ to do
busin~ss with Angola (Gulf is the key purchaser of Angolan
petroleum which provides mo~t .of Angola's revenuP.0; and
2) to project ·Jonas Savimbi and UNITA as ·•. true anti-communist .
freedom fighters. The latt~r effort crirnaxes in a highly
- publicized tour of the USA by Savimbi and the hirin~ of a
Reagan-related US publicity firm, Black, Manafert, Stone
· and Kelly for $600,000/year to do public relations for UNITA
and Jonas Savimbi. During the tour Reagan says 4'We want to
"be very helpfvl to what Dr. Savimbi and. his people are trying
to do;••

- In early 1986 an allegedly nationwide coalition of prominent
conservatives called the RAMBO {Restore a More Benevolent Order)
kick off a campaign of letter writing, returnine credit cards,
ana demonstratinr; to protect Gulf/Chevron's operatj_ons in
Angola. At the same time the US Commerce Department beGan
actively discouraginY, trade with An£ola despite the fact that
~ngrila is the third larvest tradin~ partner in Africa;
-·- - -I.
·1

r
..
i'

'

- -0~ March 25, 1986 UNITA announced that it ·had flbo~bed ~and
dynamited oil installationn _owned by Gulf/Chevron in
· cabinda, ·northern Ane:ola. Q.uestioned about the at.tack a
· State Department spokesman said the US would condemn an~
attack on American lives or nroperty, no matter who was
doing it;fl
-

tJA

Meeting in
on
of
, 1986
, the Org?nization of African Unity (OAU) conde~ned the
Reagan administration for deciding to forward military
-assistance to Savlmbi and UNITA.

r-- ... -j

!

·:I

Ib April 1986, 6 US Congressmen file a lawsuit to prevent the
US Export~~rnn.ai;t Bank from extendinr; $101.6 millio·n in loan
guarantees/\~ proerarn def>ifrnea to facilitat~ fore:i.gh customers
purchasinE US manufactured goods;
·
- In early April 1986, s~ipments of Stir~A anti- a i r craft w~apons
and. ant l tank guns sent by F resident Reagan implt~me nt inc . an
executive order bP.gin arrivine in Southern Anr;ola--presumably
via Zaire. · In doing this, Rea~an iEnores and bypasses a
Congre~sional debate raginf:; over whether or not to allow · cove.rt
or overt assistance to UNITA. Prestdent dos Santos ofAncola
reacts quickly, declaring that the US can -no lonr,er be a
mediator in the rev,ion; he asks that the UN mediate instead.
In the nrocess he reveals a ~itherto secret agreement called the
Mindelo· Act. Sie;ned by the US and Ane;ola in January 1984, the
ag~eement provides for the Us to cease flacts - of agg r e ssion against
Angola and. support for Savimbi 's UNITA • .,

Nesbitt page 12

Why? What I s behind the new ·and-· renewed

embracinp; of

· their •out-of-Africci" boy by Reagan ad.ministration?
; ,

On . one level it is part of the Reagan doctrine of the
I

quick American pr·o jection of power • . US intervention into
' Ang~la is one staging point I of the LIC's (low intensity
conflicts) which are meant to be

carried out ·by non-.

Americans, ~.e. no spilling of "good 'merican peoples' blood."
As Time magazine succinctly put it:
"American boys should not be seen
dying on the nightly news. Wars
should be over in three days or less,
or before the Congress invokes the
War Powers Act. Victory must be
assured in advance and the American
public must be all for it from the
outset."
!

•

· )'

. On another level, US intervention into Angola could
not ·be better timed in terms of rescuing South Africa.

(It's

like Matt in 'Gunsmoke• coming into the reservation to save
wounde~ ·chester surr;unded 1by the hostiles.)

Every dollar

which South Africa d.oes not have to g-i ve , to UNITA means fund.s

I

released for South Africa to contend. with the r.:rowing cr\sis
_inside South Africa itself.

·. ' .

':.

US assistance also _comes at a

N~sbitt page 13

point when the FAPLA forces of Angola had cond.ucted.
I

increasingly sucessful campaiens against UNITA.

In fact,

I

d.uring the fall of 1985, it was only ,direct South African
military intervention which -_saved UNI_TA 's southern headquarters
from 'beine: decisively overrun.

Finally, . it is hoped by Rambo

and his sons and daughters that thP. projection of Savirnbi in
1

I

.t he USA and of UNITA

1

8

struf,[le as beinf. the .major struggle

in Southern Africa can serve to confuse and thwart the esca-

lating anti-apartheid. movAment insid.e the US itself.

As the

Wa:shington Office on Africq recently pointed. out:

for US aid to ·UNITA,
South Africa's allies within the
administration and. Congress hope
to repain the rround they believA
they have loRt and are losinc to the
anti-apartheid movement. In buildinR
support fnr UNITA they khow they will
be str,.:mp;hb=minp.; apartl-teid with in ·

~By pushi~y
.

i

r.

~

..

~

'.

Pretoria's own borders and throu~hout
southern Africa. US assistance to
South Africa's agent UNITA will hP-lp

Pretoria militarily intimidate and
destabilize Angola, prolon~ South
.

.

:,

i,

-'.1

.,,'·.·
· ,.

.......

Africa's illegal occupation of
Namibia and aid it in its war against
SWAPO. If the US a.ssits UNITA, South
Africa can then divert more of its
financial resources towards strenp.;theninr;
its internal security fo~ce's crackdown

on anti-apartheid opponents~"
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